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A commentary on
Cognitive reflection vs. calculation in decision making
by Sinayev, A., and Peters, E. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:532. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00532
Sinayev and Peters (2015; hereafter S&P) present two competing hypotheses to explain
performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). They dub the first the “Cognitive Reflection
Hypothesis” and attribute it to other researchers: “Each of these researchers assumes that
differences in CRT performance indicated differences in the ability to detect and correct incorrect
intuitions. . . ” and “. . . implicitly assume that numerical ability is an irrelevant detail when it
comes to solving CRT and related problems” (p. 2). They contrast this with their “Numeracy
Hypothesis” which states that “the CRT is primarily a measure of numeric ability” (p. 3). S&P
report two studies whose results, they argue, favor the Numeracy Hypothesis over the Cognitive
Reflection Hypothesis. They conclude that numeric ability is “the key mechanism” that explains
the association between CRT performance and decision making (p. 1), although they also state
that the ability to detect and correction intuitions (apart from numeracy) plays a role in CRT
performance. Both of the hypotheses presented by S&P emphasize the role of cognitive ability
in CRT performance. In this commentary we introduce an alternative hypothesis that was not
discussed by S&P; namely, that the propensity or disposition to think analytically plays an important
role in CRT performance (Pennycook et al., 2015b). We discuss recent empirical evidence that
supports the claim that the CRT is more than just a measure of numeracy or, more generally,
cognitive ability.
DISTINGUISHING COGNITIVE ABILITY AND ANALYTIC
COGNITIVE STYLE
Dual process theorists often distinguish between disposition and ability as factors that determine
good reasoning (e.g., Stanovich and West, 2000; Stanovich, 2009; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). The
logic is as follows: If someone does not have the disposition or willingness to think analytically, they
will not fully exercise their cognitive ability and will not do as well on the problem. Naturally, the
converse is also true: If someone does not have sufficient cognitive ability, it will not matter how
much time and effort they are willing to spend thinking about the problem.
This distinction has been applied to CRT performance. For example, according to Toplak et al.
(2014): “the CRT is a measure of the tendency toward the class of reasoning error that derives
from miserly processing. This may be why the predictive power of the CRT is in part separable
from cognitive ability. The latter measures computational power that is available to the individual,
but not necessarily the depth of processing that is typically used in most situations” (p. 165). That
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TABLE 1 | Re-analysis of Pennycook et al. (2014).
Dependant variable Step Age Gender Education Income Cognitive Reflection Calculation Numeracy
Religious Belief Step 1 0.35 0.15 −0.09 −0.03
Step 2 0.34 0.13 −0.08 −0.03 −0.19
Step 3 0.34 0.13 −0.07 −0.03 −0.19 0.02
Step 4 0.33 0.12 −0.07 −0.02 −0.18 0.03 −0.07
Traditional moral values Step 1 0.14 <0.01 −0.14 0.06
Step 2 0.14 −0.02 −0.12 0.07 −0.20
Step 3 0.13 −0.01 −0.11 0.07 −0.21 0.04
Step 4 0.13 −0.02 −0.11 0.07 −0.20 0.05 −0.07
Disgust−based moral judgments Step 1 0.13 0.18 −0.15 0.15
Step 2 0.13 0.14 −0.12 0.16 −0.25
Step 3 0.13 0.14 −0.12 0.16 −0.25 −0.03
Step 4 0.12 0.13 −0.11 0.17 −0.23 −0.02 −0.08
Stepwise regression results predicting religious belief, traditional moral values, and disgust-based moral judgments. In each case, Cognitive Reflection remains a statistically significant
predictor after controlling for Calculation and Numeracy (Step 4). Cognitive Reflection = Proportion of correct responses that were not intuitive on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005). Calculation= Proportion of non-intuitive CRT responses that were correct. Numeracy= Proportion correct on Schwartz et al. (1997) three-item test. See Supplementary
Materials for further information on this study. Standardized beta coefficients. Gender: 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Significant independent predictors in bold (p < 0.05). N = 378.
each question in the CRT cues a compelling intuitive response
means that responding correctly requires that individuals expend
cognitive effort despite having what initially appears to be a
suitable response (Pennycook et al., 2015b). Importantly, this
focus on thinking disposition does not imply that cognitive
abilities (such as numeracy) are irrelevant for CRT performance.
Rather, the claim is that the CRT indexes, to some degree,
a disposition or propensity to think analytically (i.e., “analytic
cognitive style”) in addition to cognitive ability. Prima facie
evidence for the importance of thinking disposition in solving
the CRT comes from the finding that few people provide the
correct responses (e.g., 30.3% for the bat and ball problem among
undergraduate students; Pennycook et al., 2015b) despite the
apparent simplicity of the math required to check the accuracy
of the intuitive response (e.g., for the bat and ball problem:
0.10+ 1.10= 1.20 6= 1.10).
IS THE CRT JUST ANOTHER NUMERACY
TEST?
If the CRT captures some aspect of analytic cognitive style, it
should be predictive of a wide range of judgments and decisions.
However, if the CRT is “primarily a measure of numeric ability”
(S&P, p. 3), then it should only robustly predict judgments and
decisions that require some sort of mathematical operation.
There is emerging evidence that analytic cognitive style—
and the CRT in particular—is predictive of diverse psychological
outcomes that are not traditionally associated with research in
decision making (Pennycook et al., 2015c). For instance, higher
scores on the CRT are associated with religious disbelief (Gervais
and Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav et al.,
2012), paranormal disbelief (Pennycook et al., 2012; Cheyne and
Pennycook, 2013), less traditional moral values (Pennycook et al.,
2014; Royzman et al., 2014), improved scientific understanding
and reasoning (Shtulman and McCallum, 2014; Drummond and
Fischhoff, 2015), belief in evolution (Gervais, 2015), creativity on
complex tasks (Barr et al., 2015a), less reliance on Smartphone
technology as an external information source (Barr et al., 2015b),
and lowered receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook
et al., 2015a). Indexes of cognitive ability were included as
controls in many of these studies (Pennycook et al., 2015c),
including, in some cases, established numeracy tests (Pennycook
et al., 2014, 2015a; Barr et al., 2015a,b; Trippas et al., 2015).
With few exceptions, analytic cognitive style measures (including
the CRT) were predictive after controlling for cognitive ability
(including numeracy; Pennycook et al., 2015c).
What, then, of the two new studies presented by S&P? That
CRT performance was not predictive over-and-above numeracy
may simply provide evidence that the aspect of CRT performance
that reflects thinking disposition does not play a role in the types
of decisions that S&P investigated. This seems particularly likely
with respect to the incentivized outcomes in Study 2 (as discussed
by S&P, p. 12) because the very goal of incentivizing tasks in
behavioral research is to minimize dispositional variance. We
suggest that a stronger test of the role of thinking disposition
over-and-above numeracy would be in judgments or decisions
in “naturalistic” contexts where there is no clear prompt or
direct incentive to think analytically (Stanovich et al., 2013). S&P
did measure some real-world outcomes (e.g., saving money for
retirement). However, examined outcomes all included direct
incentives (e.g., monetary reward). The evidence highlighted
above indicates that CRT performance is predictive for beliefs
or judgments that not only lack incentives, but lack normatively
correct or incorrect outcomes.
As a case study, consider the results of Pennycook et al.
(2014) presented in Table 1. This study focused on predicting
religious belief, traditional moral values (e.g., trust in authority,
concerns over bodily purity), and disgust-based moral dilemmas.
Importantly, none of these constructs has any theoretical
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association with numeracy, but they do involve compelling
intuitions or societal defaults that could be influenced by
the disposition to think analytically (for further detail, see
Pennycook et al., 2014). As expected given our account,
numeracy and “calculation” (using S&P’s CRT scoring technique)
are not significant predictors of any outcome variable, whereas
“cognitive reflection” is a robust predictor for all three (see
Supplementary Materials for further details about this analysis).
Note, however, that it would be inappropriate to conclude on this
basis that numeracy has nothing to do with CRT performance.
Rather, the purpose of this analysis is to show that there are
some instances where the CRT predicts an outcome even after
controlling for numeracy. This indicates that the CRT is more
than just a numeracy measure. Similar analyses have been
done with a variety of outcome variables and with a variety
of cognitive abilities as control variables (see Pennycook et al.,
2015c).
CONCLUSION
What is the role of analytic cognitive style and cognitive ability
in decision making? Although, the answer undoubtedly depends
on the sort of decision being made, we have drawn attention to
evidence that the CRT is predictive of a wide range of outcomes,
even after controlling for cognitive ability (Pennycook et al.,
2015c). This provides evidence that CRT performance reflects,
at least to some degree, a propensity or willingness to think
analytically and the CRT, therefore, is not “primarily a measure
of numeric ability” (S&P, p. 3).
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a propensity to think
analytically does not play an important role in all (or
perhaps even most) decisions that people make in their
day-to-day lives. Moreover, it is clear that the role of
numeracy in CRT performance has not been adequately
acknowledged by dual-process theorists. Future research could
profitably follow S&P’s lead by further investigating which
types of decisions depend on numeracy, but not cognitive
style (and vice versa). This will require indices of both
analytic cognitive style and cognitive ability (and, in particular,
numeracy), as well as a more nuanced hypotheses about what
factors explain performance on reasoning and decision making
tasks.
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